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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW 
BOARD, 
Respondent. 
CaseNo.20030155-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Department of Public Safety (Public Safety) was under no obligation to 
marshal the evidence in this appeal because it has not challenged any factual finding of 
the Career Service Review Board (CSRB). The only issue is one of law: did the CSRB 
err by substituting its interpretation of a Public Safety policy for that of Public Safety? 
The CSRB has the duty of reviewing the factual support for an agency's personnel 
action and deciding whether the sanction imposed is so disproportionate that it amounts to 
an abuse of discretion. Career Service Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corr.. 942 P.2d 933, 
942 (Utah 1997). But the CSRB does not have the power to substitute its own judgment 
for that of Public Safety as to how to interpret Public Safety's vehicular pursuit policy. It 
is within Public Safety's authority and discretion to determine how a policy that it drafted 
should be interpreted. The CSRB erred as a matter of law by rejecting Public Safety's 
interpretation of a Public Safety policy and replacing the agency's interpretation of the 
policy with its own, 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY DID NOT HAVE A 
DUTY TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
Public Safety agrees with the CSRB that a party challenging the factual findings of 
the CSRB has a duty to marshal the evidence. 
Furthermore, when challenging an agency action as not based upon 
substantial evidence, appellants have a duty to "marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the 
[Board's] findings are not supported by substantial evidence." 
Road Runner Oil Inc. v. Bd. of Oil Gas and Mining. 2003 UT App 275, [^10, 76 P.3d 
692 (alteration in original); see also Covev v. Covev. 2003 UT App 380, %L7, 80 P.3d 553 
( "In order to successfully challenge the trial court's findings of fact, Almon 'must first 
marshal all the evidence in support of the flnding[s] and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding[s] even when viewing it in a light 
most favorable to the court below.'") 
But Public Safety has not challenged the CSRB's factual findings. The only issue 
raised by this appeal is a legal one. Brief of Petitioner at 1 ("The CSRB erred as a matter 
of law when it relied solely on the subjective testimony of Trooper John Pace concerning 
his belief as to whether or not he was involved in a vehicular pursuit, and disregarded the 
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question of whether such a pursuit actually occurred."). Rather than a factual finding, 
Public Safety challenges CSRB's interpretation of Public Safety's vehicular pursuit 
policy, which is contrary to Public Safety's interpretation of its own policy. 
The issue on appeal is whether CSRB has the right to reinterpret the policies of 
other agencies contrary to the manner in which the authoring agency interprets its 
policies. CSRB reads Public Safety's pursuit policy as including a subjective component: 
that no conduct of an officer could be viewed as being a vehicular pursuit unless the 
officer subjectively believed he or she was involved in such a pursuit, regardless of the 
objective facts. Brief of Petitioner at 8-9. This reading is contrary to the manner in 
which Public Safety interprets the policy. On appeal, Public Safety asks this Court to 
reverse CSRB's interpretation of Public Safety's vehicular pursuit policy, not to review 
the factual findings that the CSRB made. Because this is not a challenge to the factual 
findings of the CSRB, Public Safety has no duty to marshal the evidence. 
II. CSRB ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS INTERPRETATION OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY'S VEHICULAR PURSUIT POLICY FOR THAT 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Utah's Department of Public Safety pursuit policy defines a vehicular pursuit as 
"[a]n active attempt by an officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend 
fleeing suspects who are attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive and unlawful 
tactics." R. 59. Trooper Pace, before Public Safety's Hearing Officer, claimed that his 
actions did not constitute a vehicular pursuit because he subjectively did not believe he 
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was involved in such a pursuit. Public Safety rejected this interpretation of its policy and 
instead concluded that the policy required a review of the objective facts concerning the 
incident to determine whether a vehicular pursuit had occurred. R. 37-38. The Utah 
Highway Patrol Pursuit Review Board had previously come to the same conclusion. R. 
88-90. 
The CSRB's Hearing Officer, following Public Safety's interpretation of its policy, 
also rejected the claim that a pursuit occurs only when the officer subjectively says that it 
does. 
Trooper Pace was adamant that he did not engage in a high speed pursuit 
because the chase did not meet all the necessary criteria. He testified that 
only the pursuing officer could initiate and decide whether a high speed 
pursuit was in progress or had occurred. 
Grievant is correct when he says that there should be no discipline 
for an officer who fails to initiate a high speed pursuit. Department Policy 
and Procedure 1-21 V.A.I states that any law enforcement officer in a 
department vehicle with an operable emergency vehicle equipment and 
radio may (emphasis added) initiate a vehicular pursuit when the following 
criteria are met: (a) the suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension 
through evasive or unlawful tactics; (b) the suspect operating the vehicle 
refuses to stop at the direction of the officer; and (c) the suspect's actions 
are such that failure to pursue would further enhance the danger presented 
to the public. The term "may" is permissive and clearly indicates that an 
officer can decide whether or not to initiate a high speed pursuit. A failure 
to initiate a high speed pursuit is not, however, the basis for imposition of 
discipline in this case. Rather, it is the way the chase was conducted that 
raises the concerns. In a classic example of form over substance, Grievant 
neglects to take into account the Department's interest in "regulating the 
manner in which vehicular pursuit is undertaken and performed." See 
Department Policy and Procedure 1-211.II.III. 
R.176. 
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Public Safety does not challenge CSRB's factual findings, but its interpretation of 
Public Safety's vehicular pursuit as giving "complete discretion" to the officer to 
determine what constitutes a pursuit. R. 243. CSRB erred by reading into Public Safety's 
pursuit policy a requirement that nothing would constitute a vehicular pursuit, even if it 
met the definition provided in the policy, unless the involved officer admitted that he or 
she subjectively considered it to be a pursuit. R. 243-44; 311-12; 316 at 4-5. 
But Public Safety's policy does not give discretion to individual officers to create 
their own definitions of what constitutes a vehicular pursuit. What is left to the discretion 
of the officers is the decision of whether to engage in a vehicular pursuit. The policy 
states that officers "may initiate a vehicular pursuit" when three criteria are met. 
The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension through evasive or 
unlawful tactics. 
The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the direction of the 
officer. 
The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue would further enhance 
the danger presented to the public. 
R.59. 
When an officer initiates a vehicular pursuit, he is required to comply with the 
pursuit policy, including the requirement that "the pursuing officer immediately notify 
communications center personnel that a pursuit is underway." R. 60. CSRB erred by not 
reviewing the factual findings that the incident involving Trooper Pace met this standard. 
Instead, CSRB added a requirement to the policy: that a pursuit takes place only when the 
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officer says that a pursuit is taking place. In doing so, CSPJB conflated two distinct 
questions., 
The CSRB has combined the officer's discretion concerning whether or not to 
engage in a vehicular pursuit with the distinct question of what constitutes a vehicular 
pursuit It is this misinterpretation of Public Safety's policy that is challenged. The 
Pursuit Review Board, the department's ALJ and the CSRB's hearing officer all reviewed 
the evidence as to whether a vehicular pursuit, as defined by Public Safety's policy, had 
occurred. All found that the actions of Ross Pace on March 14, 1999 constituted a 
vehicular pursuit. Based on this factual finding, each found that Pace had violated Public 
Safety's pursuit policy and that this constituted grounds for discipline. 
The CSRB failed to address this factual issue because it reached an erroneous legal 
conclusion. Instead, the CSRB looked not at whether the underlying facts met the 
policy's definition of what constituted a vehicular pursuit, but instead considered only 
whether Trooper Pace subjectively believed he was engaged in such a pursuit. 
CHAIRMAN ATKIN: It would be most helpful, at least for me - -
because as I recall, and I reread our opinion, and I'm more convinced of it 
having reread that that what we were doing there, we weren't questioning 
the factual basis for the hearing officer's decision. Rather, we were 
interpreting what I view as legal issues in both of those instances. In the 
first instance with regard to the high speed pursuit, our analysis, though it 
may not have been a crystal clear as it might have been, and we may or may 
not need to clarify that, but our analysis on the high speed pursuit wasn't a 
question of whether somebody else could have thought it was a high speed 
pursuit. We didn't see the hearing officer having determined factually that 
there was a high speed pursuit. Rather, our analysis was that under the 
statute or the regulation, that under the regulation, a high speed pursuit is a 
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term of art that's used to describe something that comes into play only after 
the officer has exercised his discretion to determine that it is a high speed 
pursuit. 
It isn't a question of how fast he was going, it isn't a question of 
what he observed, it's not a question of what was happening on the street 
that somebody else might have determined it was a high speed pursuit. I 
think we determined that it was a high speed pursuit only after the officer 
had exercised that discretion to determine that it was a high speed pursuit. 
And I think that the evidence in that regard is undisputed, that Officer Pace 
testified that he hadn't determined that it was a high speed pursuit. 
R. 316 at 4-5 (emphasis added). 
By reading into the definition of what constitutes a vehicular pursuit an absolute 
discretion on the part of an officer in determining whether his or her actions meet the 
definition, the CSRB has made this policy unenforceable. The Pursuit Review Board and 
Public Safety's ALJ rejected Pace's claim that, because he said no pursuit took place 
regardless of the objective circumstances and facts to the contrary no pursuit did, in fact, 
occur. By rejecting Public Safety's interpretation of its own pursuit policy, CSRB 
effectively precludes Public Safety from regulating the manner in which its officers 
perform vehicular pursuits. All officers have to do is claim that they did not believe a 
pursuit was in progress and no review is permissible. 
In its brief, the CSRB has failed to address Public Safety's reliance on Holland v. 
Career Service Review Board. 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993). In Holland, this 
Court did not grant the CSRB the right to interpret an agency's policies and regulations, 
but rather used an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a challenge to the agency's 
interpretation of its own regulation. "Thus, DHRM's application of that rule was 
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reasonable and rational. Accordingly, we conclude that DHRM did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that Holland was not eligible for automatic reappointment under 
that rule." Id. It was Public Safety's right to interpret its policy, not the CSRB's. The 
CSRB erred when it substituted its interpretation of the vehicular pursuit policy for that of 
Public Safety, the author of the policy. 
Indeed, this Court has previously stated that the CSRB, rather than being a 
superagency permitted to reintrepret the policies of the agencies whose decisions come 
before it, must give deference to the decisions of those agencies. Utah Dep't of Corr. v. 
Despain, 824 P.2d 439,442 (Utah App. 1991) (CSRB required to give deference to the 
personnel decisions of agencies). 
The CSRB's role in examining the Department's personnel actions is a 
limited one. The CSRB is restricted to determining whether there is factual 
support for the Department's charges against [a grievant] and, if so, whether 
the Department's sanction of dismissal is so disproportionate to those 
charges that it amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
Career Service Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corr.. 942 P.2d 933, 942 (Utah 1997). 
The CSRB impermissibly substituted its interpretation of the vehicular pursuit 
policy for that of Public Safety. This action went beyond the CSRB's limited role and 
warrants reversal. 
The State of Utah, Department of Public Safety asks this Court to reject CSRB's 
interpretation of Public Safety's definition of what constitutes a vehicular pursuit. This 
matter should be remanded to the CSRB with instructions to uphold the hearing officer's 
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original determination that the dep; Hated the charge that Pace 
conducteu without complying with the requirements for a pursuit as 
that policy was interpreted by Public Safety. The CSRB should be ordered on remand to 
reconsider whether, with this charge upheld, the 20-day suspensio : 
Safety meets the proportionality standai d 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented above, the CSRB's final agency action should be 
reversed and this matter should be remanded to the ( SK11 .1111 i I < 11 i. I • i hold the 
department's charge that Face "hicular pursuit policy. CSRB 
shouli I hi. I ui llin"" instructed to reconsider the proportionality of the department's 20-day 
suspension. 
PETITIONER DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL 
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Petitioner does and a published opinion in this matter, 
though the petitioner desires to participate in oral argument if such is held by the Court. 
DATED this / ^ day of March, 2004. 
&&[ Oi 
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